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A two state model for opinion forming, which has proven heuristic power, is reviewed with a
novel emphasis on the existence or absence of a threshold for the dynamics. Monitored by repeated
small groups discussions floater agents update their opinion according to a local majority rule. A
threshold makes the initial supports to flow towards eitheir one of two opposite attractors with only
one single opinion. While odd sizes yield a threshold at fifty percent even sizes, which allow the
inclusion of doubt at an opinion tie, produces a threshold shift toward either 0 or 1 giving rise to
minority opinion spreading. Considering heterogeneous agents like contrarians and inflexibles turn
the dynamics threshold less beyond sone critical values. One unique attractor at fifty-fifty drives
then the dynamics. Inflexibles can generate asymmetry and if one sided they erase the threshold
ensuring the associated opinion to eventually gain the all population support. It may shed a new
and counter intuitive light on some social aspect of the global warming phenomenon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sociophysics was initiated more than twenty five years
ago [1]. It stayed confined to a very few researchers
for nearly two decades within the hostile environment
of the physics community [2]. Only recently it became a
main stream of research in physics [3, 4]. It has since at-
tracted a great deal of research with an impressive grow-
ing number of papers published each year in the main in-
ternational physical journals. Several international con-
ferences and workshops are being hold regularly every
year on the topic. The creation of the Journal of Social
Physics is one additional contribution establishing socio-
physics as a flourishing and expanding field of research.
Sociophysics covers numerous topics of social sciences
and addresses many different problems including social
networks, language evolution, population dynamics, epi-
demic spreading, terrorism, voting, and coalition forma-
tion. Among them the study of opinion dynamics has
become a main stream of research [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
Moreover public opinion is nowadays a feature of central
importance in modern societies making the understand-
ing of its underlining mechanisms a major challenge. Any
progress could have drastic effects on the way to tackle
sensitive issues to which the global world is confronted.
Our approach to tackle opinion phenomena relies on a
few simple assumptions, which in turn provide a series
of astonishing and powerful results [6, 16, 27? ]. In par-
ticular it allows to discover that the dynamics of opinion
formation follows some flow, whose direction appear to
be determined by the existence of thresholds in the ini-
tial public support for the competing issues. Most mod-
els yield such threshold dynamics. Indeed, it was shown
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that they all belong to one single probabilistic sequential
scheme [26].
It is worth to notice that in 2005, for the first time, a
highly improbable political vote outcome was predicted
using a model of sociophysics [10, 27]. Moreover the pre-
diction was made several months ahead of the actual vote
against all polls and analyses predictions [28]. The model
deals with the dynamics of spreading of a minority opin-
ion in public debates using a two sate variable system. It
applies to a large spectrum of issues including national
votes like the recent French vote, behavior changes like
smoking versus non-smoking, support or opposition to
a military action like the war in Iraq, rumors like the
French hoax about September eleven [29], and reform
proposals [30].
The model uses two state variables to study the form-
ing of a public opinion from a public debate. Agents are
floaters who discuss in small groups using a one-person-
one-argument principle. At each cycle of discussion they
update their individual opinion according to a local ma-
jority rule. The associated dynamics is driven by re-
peated local opinion updates operated trough. Local ties
may occur in even group sizes. They are solved in favor
of either one opinion according to the common believes
of the agents. The resulting opinion forming is found to
be a threshold dynamics with a separator ac,r which de-
termines the direction of an opinion flow towards either
one of two attractors aA and aB at which opinion A and
opinion B are respectively the winning majority. When
all agents are floaters the two attractors are single opin-
ionated with aA = 1 and aB = 0 where only one opinion
survives the public debate in the full population.
For an opinion A initial support at > ac,r, there exists
a number n of successive updates which make the flow to
reach the A winning attractor with at+1 < at+2 < . . . <
at+n ≈ aA. At opposite at < ac,r leads to a decreasing
series at+1 > at+2 > . . . > at+m ≈ aB where the number
m is different from n. They are both integers which can
2be calculated. Taking small values they diverge at ac,r.
For odd size update groups, ac,r = 1/2. Even sizes
allow the inclusion of doubt at an opinion tie in a group.
At a doubt, the collective belief is evoked to produce
a local bias in favor of either one opinion. Such bias
may shift ac,r anywhere between 0 and 1 depending on
the distribution of both the population collective belief
and the local updates group sizes. When ac,r << 1/2,
the associated dynamics gives rise to the occurrence of
minority opinion spreading.
Focusing on the no tie case for which ac,r = 1/2 we
study the effect of including heterogeneous agents like
contrarians [31] and inflexibles [32] in addition to floaters.
It is found to have drastic effect on the opinion dynamics.
Contrarians are agents who deliberately opposes the
local majority by shifting to the other opinion, whatever
is the majority opinion [31, 33, 34, 35, 36]. At very low
densities they create a stable coexistence between a ma-
jority and a minority with aA 6= 1 and aB 6= 0. The
threshold being unchanged at 1/2. However, beyond
sone critical values, they turn the dynamics threshold-
less [31]. One unique attractor aA = aB = ac,r = 1/2
drives the dynamics. What ever the initial conditions
are, the public debate brings the collective opinion at ex-
actly fifty-fifty. This surprising mechanism of threshold
erasing was used to explain the famous 2000 Bush - Gore
presidential election in the US. It was then predicted that
fifty-fifty elections were about to occur again and often
in voting democracies And it did happened several times
since like in Germany, Italy, Mexico [37]. The majority
level at which contrarians operate can be global instead
of local using results from polls. It gives rise to chaotic
behavior around fifty percent [33].
Inflexible agents are agents who never shift opinion
during small group discussions. They were found to pro-
duce similar effects as contrarians but with the novelty
of asymmetry since the densities of inflexibles for each
opinion are usually not equal. In particular considering
one sided inflexibles make the associated opinion certain
to gain the all population support. Even if an opinion is
supported by only a very low density of inflexibles against
a huge majority in favor of the other opinion, the debate
will reverse the ratio with eventually the all population
aligned along with the inflexibles.
Accordingly the expected democratic character of a
free public debate may turn onto a dictatorial machine
to propagate the opinion of a tiny minority against the
initial opinion of the overwhelming majority. It may shed
a new and counter intuitive light on the social aspect of
the global warming phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The local
majority model with only floater model is presented in
the next Section. Update groups are all of the same size
r. It is found that the r = 2 case may exhibit a thresh-
old less dynamics. The combination of various sizes is
then investigated. Section 3 deals with heterogeneity of
the agents with the possibility of contrarian behavior.
A threshold less dynamics is obtained with a perfectly
balanced coexistence of both opinions. One sided inflex-
ible agents are introduced effects in Section 4. Above a
small concentration of one sided inflexibles the dynam-
ics is threshold less making the favored opinion certain
to gain the support from the full population through the
public debate. The results shed a new light on some so-
cial aspect of the global warming phenomenon. Last Sec-
tion contains some discussion about the perspectives to
make sociophysics a predictive solid field of science with
an emphasis on both the challenges and the difficulties.
Extensions and limits of the approach are discussed.
II. THE LOCAL MAJORITY MODEL
The model consists of a group of N agents undergoing
a public debate. Each agent i = 1, . . . , N holds either
one opinion A or B, denoted by ai = ±1 respectively.
Before the public debate is turned on agents did make
a choice individually according to their information and
belief. Initial global proportions of both opinions are
respectively at and (1− at).
The opinion dynamics is driven by a series of repeated
cycles of local discussions during which agents update
eventually their own opinion. In each update, random
groups of r agents are formed. Within each group all
agents adopt the opinion which has the local majority.
Group size r may vary with r = 1, 2, ...L.
However using a local majority rule does not operate
in case of a tie in an even size group. Then, a common
belief “inertia principle” is applied to select either one
opinion A or B with respective probability k and (1−k),
where k accounts for the collective bias produced by the
common believes of the group members.
A k non integer value accounts for the fact that real
societies are divided into disconnected subgroups, which
may share different collective believes with not everyone
discussing with every one [27]. For instance in case of a
reform proposal, most cultures share the wisdom stating
that in case of a doubt, better to keep the situation un-
changed. It is a tip to the status quo, which would put
k = 0 if opinion A corresponds to yes to the reform. But
for other issues one social subgroup may have a common
belief yielding k = 1 while another one has an opposite
common belief with k = 0, resulting on average on an
effective bias 0 < k < 1.
Accordingly, one cycle of local update leads to new
proportions at+1 and (1− at+1) with
at+1 =
r∑
m= r+1
2
(
r
m
)
amt (1 − at)r−m . (1)
for odd sizes, and for even sizes
at+1 =
r∑
m= r
2
+1
(
r
m
)
amt (1−at)r−m+ka
r
2
t (1−at)
r
2 , (2)
3where
(
r
m
) ≡ r!
m!(r−m)! is a binomial coefficient.
This local majority rule mechanism was first intro-
duced in the eighties to study of bottom-up hierarchical
voting models. There, groups of agents designate repre-
sentatives at a higher hierarchical level using local ma-
jority rule and in case of a tie vote, a status quo inertia.
To study the dynamics associated with these update
Equations we solve the fixed point Equation at+1 = at.
It yields two attractors aA = 1 and aB = 0 and a thresh-
old 0 < ac,r < 1, which separates the flow opinion in
direction of either aA = 1 or aB = 0 as shown in Figure
1 depending on the location of at with respect to ac,r. if
at > ac,r, one update gives at+1 > at.
Repeating the update gets the support closer to the
attractor aA = 1. Indeed there exists a number n to
reach it with the series at < at+1 < at+2 < . . . < at+n =
an+1 = aA = 1 at which an equilibrium state is obtained
with only opinion A. The opinion has totally disappear.
From at < ac,r, we get at > at+1 > at+2 > . . . > at+m =
am+1 = aB = where now opinion A has disappeared.
In the case of odd size groups, ac,r = 1/2. But for
even sizes the possibility of local doubt at a tie breaks
the symmetry between opinion A and B according to
the value of k, which is determined by the distribution
of collective believes in the population. The threshold
value ac depends on r and k [27]. Figure 1 exhibits the
three cases with ac,r = 1/2 (top), ac,r < 1/2 (middle),
and ac,r > 1/2 (bottom). For odd sizes and k = 1/2 for
even size ac,r = 1/2.
Solving the problem exactly in the case of groups of
size r = 4 yields for the threshold
ac,4 =
6k − 1−√13− 36k + 36k2
6(2k − 1) , (3)
which yields ac,4 = 0.23, 0.77, 1/2 for respectively k =
1, 0, 1/2. It shows explicitly how the existence of doubt
combined with a collective belief, which favors on opin-
ion, here A, can turn the public debate into a machinery
to propagate a minority opinion when k = 1. To win the
majority the initial A support must satisfy at > 0.23.
Increasing the group size r damps this effect by
making ac,r closer asymptotically to the value 1/2.
For instance k = 1 gives respectively ac,r =
0, 0.23, 0.35, 0.39, 0.42, 0.44, 0.45, 0.47, 0.46, 0.47 for r =
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 as reported in Figure (2).
Nevertheless it is worth to emphasize that people discuss
in small groups whose size never exceeds a few. Larger
groups usually split in smaller ones.
A. The appearance of a non threshold dynamics
From Figure (2) it appears that while the threshold
value decreases with smaller group size, it reaches zero
at r = 2, i.e., for pairwise discussions. It implies a rather
strong effect in the opinion dynamics bias driven by dis-
cussions within couples. Indeed many exchanges occur
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FIG. 1: The opinion flow for the A opinion with ac,r = 1/2
(top), ac,r < 1/2 (middle), and ac,r > 1/2 (bottom).
by pairs. It is noticeable that for pairwise groups the
threshold ac,2 = 0, i.e., any A opinion is certain to in-
vade the all population given k = 1.
It is the first appearance of a threshold less dynam-
ics. Any initial supports for opinion respectively A and
B ends up with the all population sharing opinion A.
410 20 30 40 50
r
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0.4
0.5
ac,r
FIG. 2: The threshold ac,r as a function of even size r =
2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 30, 50 for k = 1.
Unless we start at at = ac,2 = 0 with the all population
holding opinion B from the start, which in turn means no
dynamics at all. Studying the r = 2 case more generally
Eq. (2) writes
at+1 = a
2
t + 2kat(1− at) . (4)
It yields tow opposite regime, both being threshold less
as exhibited in Figure (3). In the range 0 ≤ k < 1/2, the
separator is ac,2 = 1 with the unique attractor aB = 0.
Any initial condition, besides at = 1 leads to at+n = 0.
At contrast for 1/2 < k ≤ 1, we have the separator ac,2 =
1 with the unique attractor aA = 1. Any initial condition,
besides at = 0 leads to at+n = 1. The case k = 1/2
produces an invariant dynamics with at+1 = at. Agents
do change their opinions individually but on averaged the
global supports do not.
It is worth to stress that such an effect has been corrob-
orated from a nice analysis of data from the 2004 Amer-
ican presidential election to analyze the marriage gap,
i.e. the difference in voting for Bush and Kerry between
married and unmarried people. It appear to be possible
to interpret this marriage gap in terms our model with a
positive value of k and Bush denoted by opinion A [24].
B. Mixing the group sizes
However, in real life people don’t discuss always in suc-
cessive groups of the same size, therefore to make our
model more realistic we consider the distribution given
by pr the probability to have a local group of size r with
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FIG. 3: The variation of at+1 as a function of at from Eq. (4).
The upper part includes the series k = 1 (above external line),
k = 0.90 (upper inside), k = 0.80, k = 0.70, k = 0.60, and
k = 1/2 (the diagonal straight line). Any initial A support
at 6= 0 is expanded through the public debate towards total
invasion at aA = 1. The lower part includes the series k =
0 (below external line), k = 0.10 (below inside), k = 0.20,
k = 0.30, k = 0.40, and k = 1/2 (the diagonal straight line).
Any initial A support at 6= 0 is shrunk through the public
debate towards total disappearance at aB = 0. The opposite
dynamics associated to an initial A support at = 0.30 is shown
for both cases k = 0.80 (upper part) and k = 0.20 (below
part).
the constraint,
L∑
r=1
pr = 1, (5)
where r = 1, 2, ..., L stands for respective sizes 1, ..., L
with L being the larger group [10]. Accordingly the gen-
5eral update Equation writes
at+1 =
L∑
r=1
pr{
r∑
j=N [ r
2
+1]
Crj a
j
t (1− at)r−j (6)
+kV (r)Crr
2
a
r
2
t (1 − at)
r
2 },
where Crj ≡ r!(r−j)!j! , N [ r2 + 1] ≡ Integer Part of ( r2 + 1)
and V (r) ≡ N [ r2 ]−N [ r−12 ]. It gives V (r) = 1 for r even
and V (r) = 0 for r odd.
The occurrence of local ties in even size groups pro-
duce from Eq. (7) an asymmetry in the polarization dy-
namics towards either one of the two competing opin-
ions with a threshold ac,<r>, which may be very un-
fair for one of the two opinions. We illustrate the
process choosing for the size distribution the set p1 =
0.10, p2 = 0.25, p3 = 0.10, p4 = 0.30, p5 = 0.10, p6 = 0.15,
which yield ac,<r> = 0.214, 1/2, 0.786 for respectively
k = 1, 1/2, 0.
Figure (4) illustrates above set of pr for the three dif-
ferent cases k = 1, 1/2, 0 for the same initial minority
support at = 0.30. When the collective believes favor
opinion A, its initial support at = 0.30 is seen to increase
drastically driven by the public debate. Only four up-
dates are enough to make opinion A the majority. For a
neutral tie effect, it will decrease towards zero while for a
bias in favor of opinion B, it falls off very quickly to zero
support as seen from Figure (4).
III. HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS AND THE
CONTRARIAN EFFECT
Up to now, we have considered an identical behavior
for all agents to make up their opinion. Each one gives
its own opinion in a discussing group, and eventually all
shift along the same opinion, the one which has received
the majority of arguments. In case of a local tie, it is the
collective belief bias which sets up the choice. However,
it is clear that in real life situations, agents may exhibit
different types of behavior in their cognitive process of
choosing their opinion.
Among others, we introduced the contrarian behavior
to account for agents who determined their choice, not
with respect to some getting convinced criterion but just
to oppose what the others think [31, 33]. Accordingly a
contrarian is someone who deliberately decides to oppose
the prevailing choice of the majority around it whatever
that choice.
In the case of update groups of odd sizes Equation (1)
is changed to
at+1 = (1 − 2c)
r∑
m= r+1
2
(
r
m
)
amt (1 − at)r−m + c . (7)
where c is the density of contrarians among the floater
population. It shows that the associated dynamics is
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FIG. 4: The variation of the general update from Eq. (7)
for the set of size distribution p1 = 0.10, p2 = 0.25, p3 =
0.10, p4 = 0.30, p5 = 0.10, p6 = 0.15 and an initial A support
at = 0.30. The top part corresponds to k = 1 which yields
ac,<r> = 0.214. The A minority wins the majority rather
quickly. The middle part has a neutral tie with k = 1/2
which yields ac,<r> = 1/2. The A support decreases towards
zero. The bottom part shows the case of the tie breaking in
favor of the B opinion with k = 0 and ac,<r> = 0.786. The A
support disappears fast.
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FIG. 5: The contrarian two attractors acA,B from Eq. (8) as
a function of contrarian density c. At c = 1/6) both acA and
acB merge with the separator ac,3 = 1/2 to turn the dynamics
threshold less. In the range 1/6 ≤ c ≤ 1/2, the dynamics leads
systematically to a fifty-fifty coexistence between opinions A
and B.
changed since at = 0 and at = 1 yielding respectively
at+1 = c and at+1 = 1−c, are no longer fixed points of the
Equation at+1 = at. However ac,r = 1/2 is unchanged as
a fixed point.
Solving the fixed point Equation for r = 3 yields
acA,B =
1− 2c±√1− 8c+ 12c2
2(1− 2c) , (8)
which are shown in Figure (5). It is seen that at low den-
sities of contrarians, increasing c makes both attractors
to move symmetrically towards the threshold ac,3 = 1/2
with acA < 1 and a
c
B > 0. They are found to all merge
with acA = a
c
B = ac,3 = 1/2 at exactly c = 1/6. In the
region 0 ≤ c ≤ 1/ the opinion dynamics yields a stable
coexistence between a A majority (B) and a B minority
(A).
Figure (6) exhibits the two cases of c = 0.05 < 1/6
and c = 0.35 > 1/6. The evolution of at = 0.30 is shown
in both cases. The first one leads to a B majority and a
A minority while the second one produces a fifty / fifty
support.
A. Threshold less driven coexistence
From c = 1/6 and beyond in the range 1/6 ≤ c ≤ 1/2
the dynamics becomes threshold less. Instead of having a
flow which puts ahead one of the two competing opinions,
it now reduces any initial difference to zero to establish
a perfect equality between the two competing opinions A
and B as seen in Figure (5).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 at
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
at+1
Separator
B majority
A majority
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 at
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
at+1
Separator
FIG. 6: The evolution of at+1 as a function of at for c =
0.05 < 1/6 (upper part) and c = 0.35 > 1/6 (bottom part).
The evolution of at = 0.30 is shown in both cases. The first
one leads to a B majority and a A minority while the second
one produces a fifty / fifty support.
Driven by the local discussions and the contrarian ef-
fect the two attractors acA and a
c
B have disappear a the
profit of one unique attractor located at the former sepa-
rator ac,3 = 1/2. Once the equilibrium is reached, agents
keep on updating their opinion due to the contrarians
who never settled down on a fixed opinion. However the
7net effect of these individual opinion changes is perfectly
self-balanced.
Any election to be held in that state yields very nar-
rowed results which are by nature disputable due to in-
compressible counting errors which score less than the
expected statistical fluctuations.
For larger values of the contrarian density with c > 1/2
the dynamics becomes alternating. In the range 1/2 ≤
c ≤ 5/6, the majority is shifted from one opinion to the
other one at each new update, but with the difference in
amplitude getting shrunk till reaching zero at the same
attractor 1/2. Beyond with 5/6 < c ≤ 1, the dynamics
is still alternating, but now 1/2 is again a separator with
two alternating attractors acA < 1 and a
c
B > 0 given by
the fixed point Equation at+1 = at. Figure (7) exhibits
the two cases c = 0.70 and c = 0.90 for an initial A
support at = 0.30.
The contrarian behavior was also extended to the level
of the majority at the collective choice given by polls [33].
The effect is similar to the previous one but now a chaotic
behavior is obtained around fifty percent.
IV. THE ONE SIDED INFLEXIBLE EFFECT
AND THE GLOBAL WARMING ISSUE
Another specific feature of human character is the in-
flexible attitude. An inflexible agent sticks to its opinion
whatever arguments are given to it, it never shift opinion
[32].
The effect on the dynamics is similar to the contarian
effect with the introduction of an asymmetry between
the two opinions A and B, depending on the the ratio
in the respective proportions of inflexibles. In particular
the separator is no longer located at 1/2 and the two
attractors are not any more symmetric [32].
While it seems natural to have inflexible agents on both
sides of any social issue at stake, some peculiar cases
do not obey this logic. In particular issues for which
some agents are convinced to have a “scientific proof” to
justify their opinion against only doubts prevailing on the
other side like for the question of human-caused global
warming.
In this problem, some agents do believe a scientific
proof has been obtained to link the global warming to the
man-made production of carbon dioxide. On the other
side some agents, much less numerous, claim there is no
scientific proof of human culpability. But at the same
time they have neither a proof of another cause or the
proof men are not guilty. In between these two groups
the majority of agents are floaters.
To model the public debate associated to such a situ-
ation we consider a proportion q of inflexible agents in
favor of opinion A with other agents being floaters who
obey a local majority rule. We also assume that initially
the majority of floaters support opinion B. For r = 3 the
corresponding update becomes, instead of Equation (1),
at+1 = a
3
t + 3a
2
t (1− at) + q(1 − at)2, (9)
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Fifty  fifty
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FIG. 7: The alternating opinion dynamics for c > 1/2. The
top part shows the case c = 0.70 for which the dynamics is
threshold less with a convergence towards the attractor fifty /
fifty. The bottom part exhibits the case c = 0.90 where there
exists alternating attractors. The evolution of at = 0.30 is
shown for six successive updates in both cases.
where last term accounts for the configurations where
two opinion B holders discuss with one inflexible A agent,
yielding the respective opinions unchanged by the local
update. It is worth to underline that at ≤ q by definition
of the inflexibles.
To study the effect on the dynamics we solved the new
fixed point Equation at+1 = at, which yields two attrac-
tors aA = 1 and
aqB =
1
4
(
1 + q −
√
1− 6q + q2
)
, (10)
with a separator located at
aqc,3 =
1
4
(
1 + q +
√
1− 6q + q2
)
. (11)
8Both aqB and a
q
c,3 are defined
The first effect of the one-sided inflexibles is to pre-
vent the total disappearance of opinion A even if all the
floaters support opinion B. An initial situation with a
small inflexible minority at = q strengthens the A sup-
port to at+1 = q + q
2 − q3 after one update. However
in the range 0 ≤ q ≤ (3 − 2√2) ≈ 0.172, any A support
satisfying at < 0.172 leads to the B opinion to eventually
win the public debate.
On the contrary, any initial support which satisfies
at > 0.172 ends ups with a total victory of A opinion
even with eighty percent of initial support for opinion B.
The process is illustrated in the upper part of Figure (8)
with q = 0.05 and at = 0.30.
A. The threshold less case
The surprising additional effect from including one-
sided inflexible agents is that with increasing the inflex-
ible density q, both aqB and a
q
c,3 move towards one an-
other to eventually merge at q = 3 − 2√2 ≈ 0.172 with
aqB = a
q
c,3 ≈ 0.293, and then disappear. One example is
exhibited in the bottom part of Figure (8) with q = 0.20
and at = 0.30.
It means that in the range q > 0.172, any B support,
even huge ones, systematically looses the public debate
against ultra small A minorities. The various regimes are
shown in Figure (9). The grey area represents the incom-
pressible A inflexible domain. The A attractor aA = 1 is
independent and stayed unchanged.
Above results may enlighten the mechanisms by which
the public debate about the human culpability with re-
spect to the global warming has gained such an increasing
support all over the world. But that is not a formal proof,
it is only another way to look at the associated dynamics.
V. CONCLUSION
Sociophysics is a promising field by it specific capacity
to reproduce some complex social situations within a new
coherent frame with the discovery of novel and counter
intuitive dynamics active in the social reality.
With respect to opinion dynamics it emphasizes the
biases which may be involved in the holding a public de-
bate to decide about some major social issue. Within our
model, we saw how a free public debate produces quite
naturally a dictatorial machine to propagate the opinion
of a tiny minority against what could have been the initial
opinion of an overwhelming majority. While rationality
is applied using a majority rule, the possible occurrence
of local doubts opens the way to have the collective be-
liefs to make the choice. In case of a threshold dynamics
these collective beliefs biases can shift the threshold from
fifty percent to any side at values from ten percents to
ninety percents.
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FIG. 8: The evolution of at+1 as a function of at from Eq. (9)
for q = 0.05 < (3−2√2) ≈ 0.172 (upper part) and q = 0.20 >
(3− 2√2) ≈ 0.172 (bottom part). The evolution of at = 0.30
is shown in both cases. The first one leads to a very large
B majority and a A minority while the second one produces
a huge support in favor of opinion A, which eventually gains
the full population support.
The model apply to a large spectrum of social, econom-
ical and political phenomena. In particular, propagation
effects like fear propagation and rumors spreading. It
was used to explain the French hoax about September
eleven [29].
Moreover, in 2005 for the first time, a highly improba-
ble political vote outcome was predicted several months
ahead of the actual vote [10, 28]. The victory of the no
to the French referendum on the European constitution
was confirmed by the actual vote. It is worth to stress
that early polls and all analyses were predicting a vic-
tory of the yes. The heuristic power of sociophysics was
clearly demonstrated as feasible. Nevertheless one re-
90.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 q
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Fixed points
FIG. 9: The three fixed points from Eq. (9)
as a function of the inflexible density q. The attractor
aA = 1 is idendepend of q. At opposite both a
q
B (lower
curve) and aqc,3 (middle curve) gets closer and closer with
increasing q to merge and disappear at
q = (3− 2√2) ≈ 0.172 with aqB = aqc,3 ≈ 0.293 (little empty
circle). The arrows show the direction of the opinion flow
driven by the public deabe. the grey area is the
incompressible inlexible proportion of A opinion given by q.
sult is not sufficient to make definite conclusion. Clearly,
more studies are needed.
In this paper we have given some possible explanation
to the growing public support for the thesis of human
guiltiness for the current global warming. It was shown
why the associated opinion dynamics will make that opin-
ion of human guiltiness certain to become unanimous
without a scientific proof of its rightness. In particu-
lar the model shows how powerful is the driving force of
individual self-confidence to get a very small minority to
reverse successfully a huge opposite majority opinion.
To conclude, we have presented a simple model which
is able to reproduce some complexity of the social reality.
It suggests that the direction of the inherent polarization
effect in the formation of a public opinion driven by a
democratic debate is biased from the existence of com-
mon believes within a population. Homogeneous versus
heterogeneous situations were shown to result in different
qualitative outcomes.
Last, but not least, it is of a crucial importance to
keep in mind that we are using models to mimic part
of the reality. They are only an approximation of that
reality. They are not the reality To forget the difference
may lead to some misunderstanding and misleading con-
clusions of what should be done the reality with a misuse
of the approach. The limits of the approach must be
always discussed before making any prediction. At this
stage, the collaboration with psycho sociologists as well
as political scientists would be welcome.
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